POLITICK MAXIMS AND OBSERVATIONS

Written by the most learned

HUGO GROTIUS.

Translated for the ease and benefit of the English *STATES-MEN.*

BY

H. C. S. T. B.

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Philo
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TIUS
rable
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you'l

To the Reader.

I Shall not beg pardon for this Addreſſe to the *Engliſh Readers*. What is here preſented to view, is the *Digeſt* of the immortal *HUGO GROTIUS*. The *Subject matter* was firſt lent by that learned Frier *CAMPANELLA*, but hee was rather the *Occaſion* than the *Author*. For *CAMPANELLA'S* ſhare of this work, was onely a piece of his *Philoſophia realis*, which had ſlept forgotten, had not *GROTIUS'* wak'd it by theſe admirable *Obſervations*. And theſe ſpeak the Author ſo fully, that you'l confeſſe he travail'd farther

ther, while he ſate ſtil, then ev
Vlyſſes was feign'd to do; an
(without the Encounters o
Circe and the *Sirens*) not one
ly πολλῶν, but

Πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἴδεν ἄρε
καὶ νοὸν ἔγνω

Now if you ſuſpect th
Engliſh falls ſhort of *GRO*
TIUS own *Latine*, I woul
gladly know who it is tha
can reach it? but if you loo
for the ſenſe faithfully ren
der'd (and reaſonably yo
can expect no more) I aſſur
you 'tis done; and that o
his word who hath choſen ra
ther to loſe his livelyhood
than to ſubſcribe to a Lye.

Farewell.

T

To the moſt learned *HUGO GROTIUS* the Author.

OUr Ages Wonder, by thy Birth the Fame
Of Belgia, *by thy Baniſhment the Shame:*
Who to more knowledge younger didſt arrive
Than forward Glaucius, *yet art ſtill alive:*
Whoſe Maſters oft (for ſuddenly you grew
To equall and paſſe thoſe, and need no new;
To ſee how ſoon, how far thy Wit could reach)
Sat down to wonder, when they came to teach:

Oft then would Scaliger *contented be,*
To leave to mend all times *to polish thee,*
And of that paines effect did highlyer boast,
Than had he gain'd all that his Fathers lost:
When thy Capella *read (which till thy hand*
Had clear'd, grave and learned did understand,
Though well thou might'st at such a tender age
Have made ten lessons of the plainest page)
That King of Criticks stood amaz'd to see
A work so like his own set forth by thee:
Nor with lesse wonder on that Work did look,
Than if the Bridgroom had begot the book,

To whome thy age and all seem'd to unite,
At once the Youth *of* Phœbus *and the* Light.
Thence lov'd thee with a never dying flame,
As the adopted heir to all his Fame.
For which care, wonder, love, the riper daies
Paid him with just, and with eternall praise;
Who gain'd more honour from one verse of thine,
Than all the Canës *of his Princely line.*
In that he joy'd, and that oppos'd to all,
To Titius *spright, to hungry* Schoppius *gall.*
To what (with cause disguised) Bonarcius *writes,*
To Delrio's *rage, and all his* Loyolites

But

- 1994

But though to thee, eac
tongue, each art be know
As all thy time that had in
ploy'd alone,
Though truth do naked to t
fight appear,
And ſcarce can we don
more, then thou canſt cle
Though thou at once do'ſt di
ferent glories joyne,
A lofty Poet *and a deep D*
vine,
Canſt in the pureſt ph
cloath ſolid ſence,
Scævola's *Law in* Tulli's *el*
quence.
Though thy imployments ha
excel'd thy pen,
Shew'd thee much ſkil'd
Books, but more in men.
And prov'd thou canſt at t
ſame eaſie rate.
Correct an Author and uphol
a State.

Thoug

Though rare praiſe, do a full truth appear
To Spain *and* Germany, *who more do fear*
(Since thou thy aid didſt to that State afford)
The Swediſh *counſels then the* Swediſh *ſword.*
All this yet of thy worth makes but a part,
And we admire thy head leſſe then thy heart;
Which when in want was yet too grave to cloſe
(Though woo'd) with thy ungratefull countries foes.
When their chief Miniſters ſtrove to entice,
And would have bought thee, at what ever price:
Since all our praiſe and wonder is too ſmall,
For each of theſe, what ſhall we give for all?

Above

Above the reach or stroke
Fortune live,
Not valuing what she can't
or give;
For low desires oppresse
loftiest state,
And who lookes down on
looks down on Fate.

FALKLAN

MANIPVLVS POLITICVS
OR,
Politique Maxim's and Cautions.

PART I.
CHAP. I.

Of Politique Communities.

THE Sense and Apprehension of Mans self-insufficiency, was the Aphor. 1.
first thing that link'd men into communities. For Man finding himselfe unable to stand alone, was compell'd by Necessity to betake himselfe to the support of others.

2. Dominion therefore re-
quires the Union of many in-
to one Body, which is calle
thence a Community, a Poli-
cy or Body; becauſe no Ma
can Politically be his own
Lord nor the Lord of an
one ſingular perſon.

3. Dominion is two fold,
1. Naturall, or 2. Violen
By the Naturall, the Sou
rules the Body, Parts, and A
fections.

By the Uiolent, the Affect
ons ſometimes Lord it ov
the Reaſon.

Obſervator.

4. Man is borne to ho
Society with All Men: an
vident ſigne whereof is, h
Speech, and naturall tend
affections, if they be not co
rupted by Education.

5.

5. 6. There is a threefold Community { 1. Of Soules or Mindes. 2. Of Bodies. 3. Of Fortunes.

First, the Community of Minds, which is call'd *RELIGION*, and that is the chiefe community, which is the very Soule of Policy, & the ſhield of Naturall Juſtice: *and it is the great Tye that links man to God, and man to man, whence Religion hath its name, à Religando.*

Obſervat.

This Religious Union, is evident amongſt the *Jewes*, but more amongſt *True Chriſtians*: amongſt *Mahumetans* very little: amongſt *Pagans* none at all: unleſſe we rather regard the bare ſound of the Name, then any Morall effect.

2. The Community of Bo
dies. This ſtands in the ſecon
ranck of Tye's or Combina
tions. By this the Gra
Turk rules over *Mahumetan*
Iewes and *Chriſtians*, whic
under his Empire are united
Body, although in Soule a
Religion far differing.

3. Community of Fo
tunes or Goods, obtaines t
third place. By this the *Tu*
rules over the *Turks*, and *R*
guſans too, and the King
Spaine over the *Genoeſe*, *N*
apolitane and *Spaniard* :
the *Geneoeſe* have eſtates l
ing in that Kings Territorie
and traffique there.

Some Communities the
are mixt of all theſe three.

CHA

CHAP. II.

Of the Function and Degrees of Lords and Rulers, whence flowes the divers kinds of Republiques and regiments, &c. Of their Circulations, &c.

HEe Naturally Rules, that excells in vertue. He naturally serves that is Inferiour in vertue, or has none at all. Where the contrary is, there the dominion is violent. Max. 1.

2. Politique Excellency consists either in the { 1. Mind, or 2. Body, or 3. Both.

3. He rules best that excells in both, as *CÆSAR* did.

He Rules next-best that excells in Mind, as *Vlysses*.

Thirdly, He that excells in Body, that is, in strength and activity, as *Ajax*.

Observator.

" But being it is Naturall
" for the Soule to excell the
" Body: He that by ſtrength
" of body over-rules them
" that excell in mind, rule
" violently: as of old the
" Giants, and afterward
" *Brennus*, and *Attila*, and
" many more.

4. The firſt thing that gaine
Dominion amongſt Men, wa

1. *POWER.*
2. *WISEDOME.*
3. *LOVE.*

Addit. " *The mixture of all thre*
" *is rare, and admirable.*
" *Power without wiſdom i*
" *Brutiſh and Barbarous.*
" *Tyranny, this is Lyon*
" *like Dominion.*
" *Wiſedome without Love,*
" *is but a Cheating Hypocri-*
" *tical Dominion. This is Fox-*
like.

" *like. Hence* Lewis *the* 11. " *of France, gain'd the title of* " Lewis the Fox. *But Love* " *cements all, and makes Do-* " *minion durable.*

" *Hence Poets ſay that Cu-* " *pid (or Love) is the Anti-* " *enteſt of all the Gods, for* " *indeed Love made the World* " *and Harmony preſerves it.*

5. The Supreme Power is the Power of the Sword, *that is the Power of* Life and Death, which reſides in them to whom the laſt appeale in Criminalls is referred.

6. Domini- } Good man is called *Monarchy*
on of one } Evill men, *Tyranny.*

The Domini- } Good ones, *Ariſtocracy.*
on of many } Bad ones, *Oligarchy.*

The Domini- } Good ones, *Policy.*
on of all } Bad ones, *Democracy.*

It is the Office (or Duty) of those that Rule

their subjects

1. To teach and instruct
2. Defend
3. Nourish or Feede
4. To maintaine the rights of

Which seeing no King can undergoe of himselfe alone, he does the

1. By Priests, Doctors, and Lawes.
2. By Souldiers.
3. By Husband-men, Merchants and Artificers.
4. By Judges, that judge according to Law.

On the other side, the people owe to their Prince two things

1. Reverence.
&
2. Obedience.

8. Those are called *Kings* which preferre the publique be-

before their own private good: but *Tyrants* which doe the contrary.

9. *A Kingly Government, does very rarely degenerate (except by degrees) into a Democratique, yet in* Athens *it did so: which Originally was a Monarchy.*

10. When a Popular State, by Miſ-government, is corrupted; there ſprings up in lieu of it, either a Tyrant, as *Piſiſtratus*, at *Athens*, or * King: as *Coſmo Medices*, at *Florence*. Or Vaſſalage under Strangers, thoſe of *Piſa*, by his meanes, became ſlaves to the *Florentines*. Commonwealths by Luxury and Pride, ſhrink and contract themſelves into an Oligarchy. So *Rome* fell into the hands of a Decemvirate or Governement by

* *He was a Duke equall to a King.*

Ten-Men: which lasted not long, but was quelled (observe it!) by the People Rising under the conduct of *Virginius*: so the *Athenians*, under the conduct of *Thrasybulus*, cut off and suppressed the *Thirty Tyrants*.

11. Strife betwixt Commons and Nobles, encreaseth a Common-wealth: but the Commons bee Conquerour, so as *To draw the Nobles to their Bent* The Republique goes to wrack: as it hapned in *Florence*: a state of all others most subject to changes. But if the Noblest win the day Tyranny forthwith steps in as heretofore in *Genoa*: and the Republique falls to ground. But

Contentions about the Change of Religion, or the

Sh

Sharing of *State* (which by a new Name, we call *Levelling*) is ever the utter undoing of all, especially where the Conquerors are but few. Yet in *Flanders*, *Holland*, and *Friesland*; they are not so much wasted by varieties of Religion, as the *French*, *Polack*, and *English* are: because they are compell'd into Union by the common enemy the *Spaniard*.

Observator.

"*The strife of Peares and*
"*people, so long as they keepe*
"*from down-right blowes,*
"*may be reckoned in the num-*
"*ber of those which* Herod 'Αγαθὸν
"*calles, Good and advanta-* Ἔρις.
"*geous contentions: but when*
"*by Ambition and Avarice*
"*the Sedition of the* Apuleij
"*and the Gracchi, and after*
them

"them the warrs of Sylla and
"Marius crept in, the Repub-
"lique of Rome began to look
"Monarchish: which as Jul.
"Cæsar invaded upon a Po-
"pular Accompt: so would
"Pompey have probably done
"upon the SENATE's
"In some places, such is the
"Education of divers that
"are called Nob'e-men; that
"you may expect Vertue from
"any men, sooner then from
"Them.

"Strifes about Religion are
"there most Pernicious and
"Destructive, where Provi-
"sion is not made * for Disse-
"ters: That they may live
secure: and the Supreme Ma-
gistrate makes not their secu-
rity good to them in good
Earnest, whereupon Tumults
and jarrs about Religion have

* Grotius favours Tolera-tion.

ri-

riſen that have vexed *Germany*, but almoſt quite deſtroyed both *France* and the *Netherlands*.

So much for Internal changes.

Externall follow. Such are

Forraign Invaſion, Plagues, Inundations, and Conflagrations Uniuerſall. *Corruptions Externall.*

Which Diſaſters oft-times ſo change the face of things, that Inhabitants are glad to begin the world again.

"*Theſe we may not* (*as the* "*Author here ſeemes to do*) "*impute to any Magicall* "*Fatality, in the* Numbers *of* "7. *or* 9. (*which yet he laies,* "*have been Experimentally* "*found ominous*) *nor yet to* "*the ill-complexion of ſtarrs,* "*that* (*as I may ſay*) *attend* "*the* Add.

"*the Horoſcope of ſuch and*
"*ſuch Kingdomes and Com-*
"*monwealths: (though I*
"*will not deny, but God*
"*(the great* Demiurgus)
"*brings many Plagues upon*
"*men, and Cities, by the Mi-*
"*niſtry of the Planets) but*
"*aſcribe theſe Calamities to*
"*the FINGER of GOD:*
"*which writ the PERIOD*
"*of the ASSYRIAN*
"*EMPIRE upon the*
"*Wall.* Dan. 5. *and levell'd*
"Sodom *and* Gomorrah, *with*
"*the plain wheron they ſtood.*
"Gen. 19. 25.

"*Cities and Countries are*
"*ſometimes deſtroyed by Na-*
"*turall Cauſes, but yet the*
"*hand of God may ſet them on*
"*work: as if* Ætna (*by its*
"*Eruptions*) *ſhould deſtroy*
"Sicily, *or* Veſevo, Campa-
ni

"nia: (*as it has ſometimes*
"*done*) *Earthquakes in* Italy
"*are Naturally frequent:*
"*by reaſon of the many hollow*
"*Grots and Mountaines in*
"*that Country, but if they*
"*bring deſtruction to whole*
"*Countries, or Cities,* (*as*
"*they have not long ſince*
"*done*) vere Digitus Dei----
"*firy ſins of that* Sodom,
"*&c.*

The City of *Venice* is ſubject to *Oblimation*: or the caſting up of Mud, and Sands; which may in time choake her up, and be her ruine: which of her ſelf is ſo admirably complexion'd, that ſhe can never Periſh.

Venice *ſubject to Oblimation.*

Obſervator.

"*Some remedies for this*
"*diſeaſe* (*though perhaps*
"*not ſtrong enough*) *ſhee*
"*has*

cc *has already invented: and*
cc *may devise more and better.*
Yet this advantage her Sea
bring, that they are her Bul-
wark against strangers: upon
confidence whereof, shee ha
no Militia of her own; ye
fears a Tyranny from her own
strength: and hence perhap
it may fall out, that by hyring
of forreign Commanders, sh
may at last come to ruine.

CHAP. III.

Of the Essence, Constitution and Division &c. Princedome and Dominion, &c.

THE *Romans*, upon th
suddain Emergencies o
danger, by War, or sedition
did chuse themselves an ex
tem

emporarie Monarch: which Addit.
hey called a Dictatour:
whence at last (by the Au-
thors leave) we may inferre
thus much: That a Mo-
narch is the best & safestein-
gine for any People, in time
of War or Danger. Hence
Homer *makes his wise-man,*
Ulysses *vote clearly for that;*
to carry on the Grecian
Warre

——*It is not good to have*
many heads (say's he) let
there be one Chief, one King!

For

1. The Dominion of one
ood man, is alwaies better
hen the Dominion of many,
y, of all good-ones. Yea,
2. The Male-administration
One, is much to be desi-
d, rather then that of Many,
of all in a Princedome, or
ule. 3. Sim-

3. Simply and naturally God is the Sole Lord Paramount: as having Power-Absolute over all: whose Will (as most wise) is a law to itself, and transcends the whole Scale and Predicament of things. But

4. Man is onely Lord in Degree and Measure: because his Will cannot be a Law; unless Regulated and bound up by the Law of God, either Natturall, or Positive.

5. Hee knows not how to rule a Kingdome, that cannot manage a Province: nor can he wield a Province, that cannot order a City; Nor he order a City, that knows not how to Regulate a Village: nor he a Village, that cannot guide a Family: Nor can that man Govern well a Family that

An Excellent Gradation.

know

nowes not how to Governe himselfe: neither can any Govern himselfe unlesse his Reason be Lord, *&c.* Will and Appetite her Vassalls: Nor can Reason rule, unlesse her selfe be ruled by God, and [wholy] be obedient to him.

Ergo.

Without the Divine Rule, no Man is truely a King, or Prince, according to Nature, but rather to be counted, Scourge of God, *&c.* Executioner of men. *Conclusion thereupon.*

But neither, according to the Divine Rule, is any Prince simply a LORD: but a RULER and PASTOR of his People: and the * Vice-gerent of the LORD GOD by whom Kings reign. *Vicarii Domini Dei, &c.*

6. Therefore ought a good Prince

Prince ſo farre to Excell hi
Subjects in Vertue, as th
Shepheard does his Flock
who is of a Superiour ſpeci
to them: Now ſeeing all me
are equall as to the Sp
cies, it muſt here follow th
Princes (as ſuch) muſt ha
ſomewhat of God, *&c.* pec
liar Impreſſes of *Elohim*, th
Deity in them. Therefore

7. Wiſdome alone R
beſt of all: not Sophiſtical
but Philoſophicall [yet] n
the wiſdome of the Cloiſte
or the * Cell, but Civil Wi
dome, not oppoſite, but Su
ſervient to God.

8. The Dominion of

The { 1. Male, 2. Father, 3. Oldmen, 4. Strong, 5. Maſter } Over { 1. The Female, 2. His Children, 3. Young men, 4. The weake, 5. Schollars }

Nat

Nature disposing to men.

1. Of strong Intellectuals, though weake in constitution of Bodies to be { Priests, Philosophers, Councellors.
2. Active and strong bodies, with courageous minds to be--Souldiers.
3. Gross braines and rude hands to be husbandmen.
4. Heavy and robustuous for the Cavalry or Horsemen.
5. Laborious and nimble-handed to weaving, and other Manufactures.
6. Ready tongues, and learned, for Embassies, and Orations.
7. Other sharp wits for Merchandize.

8. Just

8. Juſt men for the Bench or Tribunall.
9. Weak in Body and mind for * ſervice, and to be inſtruments for their betters.
10. Men of abilities both in body and mind, to be Commanders, Kings, and Maſters of the Militia.

* *Animadvers. They are like to make but ſorrie ſervants and inſtruments: that are weak both in body and mind.*

10. That therefore there is the beſt Republique, where every man bends himſelfe to thoſe duties and imployments which Nature hath fitted him for: For then Reaſon and Wiſdom bear ſway: and the worſt, where men are put upon imployments, which are contrary to their grain, and Genius: for then Fortune and Chance, (that is the force of Ignorance) rule the roſt.

11. Whe

11. Whence Magiſtrates are choſen, becauſe they are the Sons of Nobles, or Sons of friends of ſuch as are in preſent power, or for their Wealth, or bought Honour, and not becauſe they are good, or wiſe men; There the Republique falls to ground.

12. A Common-wealth goes to wrack ſooneſt, when the Portion makes marriages, and Equality of Wealth, and not an equall * ſtrength of body and mind, whence (according to the Pythagorean) the beſt Iſſue is to be expected: though *Plato* think (more ſlightly) the beſt breed to be of ſtrong bodies, and good wits: or on the contrary.

13. All miſchiefs ſway, where women have the Liberty to do, and ſay what they pleaſe, *&c.* 14. There

* *Valor Lat.*

* *Obſervator.*

14. These wee count C
TIZENS who not onel
are capable and partakers
dignities and honors, in t
Republique, but such, as
any Function, be it never
mean (as the members of
body) contribute to the
and advantage of the whol
The rest wee count stranger
Excrements of a Commo
wealth: such as are many N
ble-men now adaies.

15. The [true] Office
the Nobleness or Peere
[in any Republique] is
defend that, and private p
sons.

The Office of the Co
mons. to feed, and sustai
it.

The Office of the W
sort, to rule and Instruct it.

He that takes no profess

or calling at all upon him is to be look'd upon, as an Excrement, or Drone: But they that mediate betwixt God and Man, are to to be esteemed as the Diviner part of a Common-wealth: Such are the Legitimate Priest-hood.

CHAP. IV.

Of Laws and Customes, and that which is called the Reason of State.

1. THat * Good Men may be borne, and imployed in those Offices and Functions, to which they were born, every Community stands ever in need of a *Law*.

* *Lat. Optimis nascuntur.*

2. As Virtue is the *Private Law*, of *Individualls* [or

 singu-

singular Persons] so *Law* is Publique Vertue of a *Community*. Therefore being Virtue the rule of Actions, and fections in a particular Per ordained by the Decree Potent and * pliant Reason, a chief private good: so is the *Rule* of affections, Actions *Publique:* Consti ted and published from Dictates of Common Reas which respect the chief common good.

*Volentis.

3. The chief good is Preser tion: & that either { Private or Public }

which is (as far as may be thered) from Conservati [simply] or Expulsives of structives. Simply to *Cõserv* to *Enternize* [or perpetua Therfore simply, both the

vate & Publique chief good is from [*GOD*] that Eternall chief Entity. But partiall from other things: as namely, Instrumentally and Dispositively from the Rules of Reason.

4. Wherefore——No Republiques can make *Laws*, where there is not common Reason and common consent; unlesse where by common Reason (and consent) The Matter is put into the hands of the Wise-men; Such as were *Solon*, *Lycurgus*, and *Numa*.

Or unto one whom God has Delegated [for his Vicegerent] as *Moyses*, *&c.*

As for *Minos* and *Mahomet*, either Craft or the Devill led them on, to be Types of the true messengers from God, as *Moses was*.

Obſervat.

Here the Obſervator ſt
in and ſaies,

cc *I ſee no reaſon why*
cc *Edicts of one or many*
cc *lers may not deſerve*
cc *name of Lawes, not at*
cc *awaiting the Peoples C*
cc *ſents: For neither in*
cc *ſcribing medicines, do P*
cc *ſicians require the con*
cc *of their Patients.*

1. *The Divine Law:* 5. The Eternall and
Law is that, whereby G
did Faſhion, Create, Gov
and change all things
bring them about to his
ends: Even changable thi
unchangably.

2. *Law Naturall.* From this is derived
Law Naturall planted in
minds of men, and in
whole Volum of nature wh

* Gods Art, and Natures Directory: Neither can it be violated but by God: [and that by him] as a Lord, not as a Legiſlator. *Quæ eſt Ars Dei: Ejuſdemque Directrix.*

From the Law Naturall is derived the Law of Nations, Common to all men. 3. *Law of Nations.*

From the Law of Nations, the Poſitive Civill Law is derived, and ſo farre as it is agreeable to Nature, it is invariable: but as it ſerves preſent neceſſities, it may, and ſometimes ought, to be altered. 4. *Poſitive Law.*

God himſelfe alſo gave a Poſitive Law ——— which is immutable, where it containes the Law of Nature, where our neceſſities [onely] mutable, as the Law of *Moſes* in the Decalogue, remains [in full force] for ever, but not in

the forbidding of Swines-flesh: which was made on purpose to * avoid Leprosie. Yet,

No man can alter Lawes, but he that made them, or he that is Created his substitute, for that very purpose.

* *Lepram non] alendam. Lat.* ☞

Observator. Note. This observation cannot refer to anything in the Antecedent Paragraph.

"*Nature is the work of*
"*Reason without us.*
"*Humane Reason, is the*
"*work of Nature within*
"*us.*
"*The will [of man] is (of*
"*its own Nature) mutable:*
"*but Reason Immutable,*
"*except improperly: namely,*
"*when the matter about*
"*which*

which she is conversant is mutable.

6. Politique Reason, which ome call the Reason of State: nd of old, was the same with quity, does transgresse the [strict] Letter of the Law, ut not the sence and scope of t: becauses it does not abroate or interpret, *&c.* any hing but for a greater good: s in the case of *Fabius Vitulanus*: to whom the Roman Senate granted his life which was forfeited to the Law: and *Horace* that slew the three *Curatij*, * in the quarrell of he Roman Empire.

* *In the behalf of*] *or rather for the Empire.*

But the Reason of State, as it is now adaies, is nothing else but a devise of Tyrants, that carries the face of Equity, supposing it lawfull for them to transgresse, not onely their

owne, but even the Lawe of God, either to gaine o maintain their petty Domini ons. But,

The difference between Rea ſon of State, and Equity is thi For Equity reſpects the Pub lique Good and Truth : bu Reaſon of State looks upo [onely] the private and ſeem ing good of the Power in be ing.

Now ſince *Machiavel* wa found to play *Achitophel*, th name being confeſſedly impi ous, Princes began, (tha they might cover the ſhame o it) to call it the Reaſon o good Government. Whic names though given by a kna viſh Godfather, may bear a honeſt meaning. As for exam ple.

Cleonymus put to death th

Ephori

Ephori of *Lacedæmon* by a right reaſon of State: but ſo does not the [Great] *Turk* his Brethren: becauſe although he ſeem to do it for the Common good; yet being it is againſt the Law of God, and ſome other way might bee found out to prevent their aſpiring to the Throne, the fact is [Barbarous and] unreaſonable.

7. A good Prince wants not this Reaſon of State, becauſe his owne goodneſſe is a perpetuall ſhield unto him: and if any riſe up againſt him: all the People ſtand for him: as for *David*: whom his rebellious Son had deprived of his Kingdom.

But a thouſand thouſand Machiavillian Arts cannot protect a wicked Prince: becauſe,

cauſe, he is [both] Odious to the People, and to God the King of all [the World].

Now, hee that jarrs with [God] the Prime Cauſe, does fooliſhly depend upon ſecond cauſes: as it happen'd to *Ceſar* * *Borgia*: who under the no wary, and provident [Diſcipline and] Maſterſhip of Machiavell, loſt, both his life, and Fortune.

* *Ceſar, Valentine Borgia, Lat.*

☞ Thus are Machiavillians alwaies taken in their own ſnare: for want of Divine and Heavenly Knowledge, and by conceiting that by their own Wiſdome they can F thome, and foreſee: all things.

10. Thoſe Lawes are beſt which are 1. ſhort. 2. eaſy 3. few. and 4. fitted to the Manners [or Genius] of the Peop

People and the Publique good. Tyrannicall Lawes are Many, and [thoſe] obſcure, difficult, like ſo many ſnares: that ſerve the turnes of ſome one, or few, but not at all accommodated, either to the Manners, or advantage of the Publique.

9. Where Lawes are often changed: they are the forerunners of the inſtant ruine of a Republique: as *Florence* found it therefore [by ſad experience.

Obſervator.

"*Lawes belonging to Go-*
"*vernments, ought not to be*
"*alter'd unleſſe neceſſity com-*
"*pell: nor yet others, but*
"*where the profit is* [*very*]
"*evident, and* [very]
Great.

10. Where there are more Laws

* *Punitivæ quam Instructivæ.*

Laws to * punish, then to direct or instruct, it is a sign of an ill tempered Government.

11. The Acts of Laws are to command what is good: to restrain what is evill: and to tollerate things indifferent.

12. Reward, and Punishment are the two [2] spurrs of the Law [to prick men forward to observation] to them.

Observat.

" *No Law can stand without* " *punishment* [*of the transgressors of it*] *and where* " *no punishment is expressed* " *there it is Arbitrary: otherwise it were rather a Counsell then a Law: but whether a Reason ought to be* " *annexed to every Law it cannot universally be defined*: Saleucus, *and Charonda*

"rondas, *and* Plato *too*, "*follow'd this course; being* "*to make Laws for Free Peo-* "*ple, they thought good to use* "*perswasions. Where as* Sene- "ca (*having an eye upon his* "* *own Times*) *affirmes: A* "*Law with a Preface to be a* "*fooliſh thing: being a Law* "*ſhould command and not per-* "*ſwade: and* Dio Chry- "ſoſtome *compares Cuſtome,* "*to a King, but Law to a* "*Tyrant: in that Cuſtome* "*gives Law to men willing* "[*to receive it*] *but Law* "*binds the unwilling alſo.*

* *Under* Nero.

13. The three Guardians or Keepers of Laws are,

1. Honour.
2. Love.
3. Fear.

Hee that ſecures not his Laws by theſe three, is either

a

a weak or Ignorant Lawgiver, or else a Tyrant *&c.*

14. Where a thing which once was good, becomes hurtfull, it is to be forbidden: Where an Evill thing does profit [the Publique] if it be Evill of Punishment, and not Evill of Offence, it is to be Commanded. Where in its own Nature indifferent as it falls out, Good or Evill to the Republique, it is to be [according] Commanded or Forbidden.

15. The Laws of men make rather good Citizens, then simply good men. Yet Princes [and Rulers] ought to be simply good, because they are the * Light and the Law of others.

* *Aliorum Lux & Lex.*

16. The Law ought to make and ordain Equality as the Nurse

Nurſe of the Common-wealth, but not a Levelling; for as the Obſervator ſaies excellently, ſuch ſtrings make no Harmony but an Equality oppoſite to that deſtructive * conſuming inequality, which is fatall to Common-wealths. For example: Extream Poverty makes Theeves, Infidious, Perjur'd, Ignorant, and Inſtruments, of Rich wicked men. On the contrary, very Rich men are Proud, Luxurious, Unlearn'd, Contumelious, [*and I may adde out of* * Ariſtotle, *Injurious too*]

* *Inæqualitas Conſumptrix. Lat.*

*2. *Rhetor.*

Very crafty men are [commonly] given to change. Very ſtupid, are voluntarily ſervants [or ſlaves] Onely moderate men are Stable in their place, and ſtations where they live.

The

The Florentine Republique was ever the moſt unſtable, by reaſon of the ſubtlety of their wits: The *Venetian*, the moſt firm and ſtable of all, by reaſon of a Mediocrity: and allay of Dullneſſe.

17. A good Cuſtome is a ſecond Law: which does more preſerve a Common-wealth, then the Law it ſelf.

Five Cuſtomes, made *Rome*, the Princeſſe of Republiques: as *Cato in Saluſt* witneſſeth.

1. Publique Wealth.
2. Private Poverty.
3. Juſt Government abroad.
4. Freedome of ſpeech at home.
5. Unliableneſſe to fears, or deſignes.

All theſe [Cuſtomes] the Com-

Commonwealth of *Venice* observes as a Law: Except onely that shee lies open to fear: yet not in her Counsels: but from Forraigners, through want of a *Militia* of her own.

For want of the first [Publique Wealth] the *Genoesse*, are not Lords of the Sea: nor of the new world, *&c.*

For want of the fifth [that is unliableneſſe to feare, and desire] the *Genoesse* are as it were servants to Forraign Princes.

For want of the Third [*viz.* Just Government abroad] the *French* could never fix their Dominion, without the Verge of *France*. In which the *Spaniard* is peccant too: Every where severely, and ceremoniously Lording it; not at all regarding

regarding the manners, [and Temper] of the People [they rule over.]

For want of the Fourth [Custome] [that is freedom of speech] the Florentine Republique went to wrack.

Observator.

" *Manners doubtlesse* (i. e. " *Customes*) *can do more than* " *Laws: and either add vigour* " *to thẽ, or take it from them.*

Customs have brought Laws under their subjection.

Obs. Customs are either from { 1. Disposition of People or 2. Institution and Education.

" 1. *For disposition*: *The* " *French now have much* " *the old Gaules in them.* " *Humanity and Fickleness* " *saies the Observator*: give " me leave to adde Feaverish

Valour

Valour in Warre: (which *L. Florus* obſerves in their Progenitors the *Gaules*) * In their firſt onſets they are more then Men, in their ſecond, leſſe then Women.

* *Primus Impetus Major quam Virorum; Secundus minor quam Fœminarum. Flor.*

"2. *For Education: what power that has over Nature, conſult* Xenophon, *about the* Perſians *and* Lacedomonians.

18. Good governors bring in good cuſtomes, ill men and women ill cuſtomes. *Ergo*, either ill men, nor [any] woman are fit to rule: the law of Nations is the cuſtome of the whole ſpecies. (1) All mankind.

19. Not a Rigid but eaſie Government fit the Northern Nations, as being by nature a fierce people, and will hardly brook

brook the Fetters of a Republique; as Tartars, Muſcovites, Suedes, Germans, Switzers, &c.

Where they have Kings by ſucceſſion, the people have much liberty, and the Prince little power; yet after the Roman Culture, they began to live more ſeverely [and regularly, then before.] But

For Southern People, eſpecially thoſe that live under the Tropiques, no Dominion fits them but the Deſpotique (1) Lordly Rule: and the ſevereſt Lawes: becauſe they are weak in ſtrength: but ſtrong in ſubtlety. For which Reaſon they were ever [very much addicted to Ceremonies, Superſtitions, &c.

Obſervat.

* *Addictè Deſpoticè.* "*The Muſcovite and Tartar are* * *Slaviſhly Gover-*

"ed: *for there the North*
"*bears Eaſterly. The King-*
"*dome of* Swethland *is be-*
"*come Hereditary, by occaſion*
"*of Religion: but under ſuch*
"*Lawes, as are obſerved in*
"*Elective Kingdomes.*

20. *Eaſtern* People incline much to the diſpoſition of the *Southern*: as the *Weſtern* to to the *Northern*, by reaſon of the Sea adjoyning to them: and for other Cauſes: but the Spaniard is like in conditions to the *African* by his Vicinity, or Neighbourhood.

CHAP. V.

Of Legiſlators.

1. A Legiſlator is he, who Foundeth a New Empire: commonly upon new Laws, Religion and Armes, Rites,

Rites, and Fortunate Essaye
or Enterprises: as

* *Perver-
sus. L.*] *Moyses*, a good Legislat
Mahomet a * wicked one.

A Lawgiver therefore
either a God, as Christ:
the messenger of God as Mos
or a subtle Politician, that c

☞ counterfeit the good ones:
Minos, *Osiris*, *Jupiter*, Ma
met, *Zamolxis*, and the lik
who to gain belief and l
from the People, feigned the
selves to be sent from Go
For

☞ A Lawgiver should be m
renowned, most wise, m
Divine, and most Reverend.

Observator.

"*To pretend the Comma*
"*of God might perh*
"*bring some succesſe to*
* *Perito.* *Cunning*] "*skillfull man, among*
"*rude and ignorant People.*

*Sertorius amongſt the Spaniards: or to the Spaniard (now * grown civill, and learned too) amongſt the Americans: by the help of Naturall Philoſophie, Phyſick, and Aſtronomie: But in a learned age, and place, This Plot and Artifice, is cold [and ridiculous.]*

* *Iam Eruditis.*

2. Every Artiſt, becauſe is wiſe, is a King in his owne Art: for a Phyſician, hee's Lord and Ruler over a ſicke King: and ſo a Mariner, in a Tempeſt, ſaies to the Prieſts and Captaines, and the principall men, Sit you here; ſtand thou there, *&c.* Therefore muſt the Lawgiver be verſed in all theſe Arts: at leaſt underſtand their ends: how they conduce either to the profit, or prejudice of the Repub-

Republique——to purg
out the superfluous and reta
the necessary. Hence it w
Plato banish'd Poets out
his Republique: because th
were full of lies, and Ribaldr
and by crying up wick
men, cry'd down goodnes
and discouraged vertue. He
Moyses expell'd false P
phets and Painters (th
pictured the Deity) and Huc
sters, and whoremonger
&c.

A Legislator must b
throughly skill'd, in the Te
perament and manners
Countries, by the * Air
the Earth: as likewise ha
or unhappy accidents, th
usually befall such and suc
place, *&c.* as Inundation
Fires, Leprosies, Famin
&

3. Legiſlators ought to reform and purifie, not Extirpate Religion.

4. The Nobleſt Profeſſion In Mountainous Countries, are, 1. Shepheards, as in *Switzerland*, and *Scythia*.

In plain Countries 2. Huſbandmen: as in *Ægypt*.

In Maritime Countries 3. Seamen and Merchants: who for the profit they bring in; the monies that they returne and exchange] and arts and Trades they bring from Forraigne Countries: have ever been held in higheſt place and eſteem. But

Where other (eſpecially ſuperfluous) Arts are preferred before theſe, Imminent, both diſſe and ruine muſt needs follow after.

5. A Divine Legiſlator hath

the Idea of his own Republique in the Court of Heaven.

The Humane [Lawgiver] in the Government of the Universe: and mans Body.

A body Politique how actuated.

6. Man (Male and Female) are the Elements of a Republique: who consist

of { 1. Soul. 2. Body, and External. 3. Goods.

1. The Soul of a Republique, is Wisdome and Religion.

2. The Body, a Senate [Grand] Councell: or whosoever bear any Office advantagious to the Publique.

3. For Externall good [the Republique hath] Souldiers Mercenary, and Auxiliary and Forraign Merchants and Artificers.

For spirits, she hath Lawes

Fo

For Eyes, the ſearchers into Arts, and Sciences.

For ears, Spies and Merchants.

For a Tongue, Preachers, and Doctors, and Embaſſadors.

For hands, her own Militia:

For feet, Husbandmen and Tradeſmen.

7. As naturally the Soul rules the * Spirits Politically, but the Body Deſpotically [(1.) by an Imperious, and arbitrary way] and the Body rules the Eſtate as the Soule dictates to it: ſo Religion has a Politique Dominion over the Lawes, and the Senate: but over Souldiers, Tradeſmen, & ſuch like, both *Senate, Law, and Religion, rule proportionably.

* *Spiritui.*] *ſing. Lat.*

Pro tata.

8. Goods of the Mind are

firſt to be look'd after: nex
thoſe of the Body. Thoſe
Fortune, in the third place.

Obſervat.

The Lawes of friendſhip
have a ſtricter tie then thoſe
Civill ſociety.

*Here endeth the firſt part
Politique Maxims and
Cautions.*

MANIPVLVS POLITICVS
OR,
Politique Maxim's and Cautions.

PART II.
CHAP. VI.
Of Colonies and Cities.

THey that Rule over Countries lying under ſeveral Climes, muſt either govern them by diſtinct Laws, or make exchanges of Inhabitants, by mutuall tranſplantations. So the *Romans* (to ſecure their Empire) carried Colonies over into *Germany*, that by

their example, the *Germans* (unaccustomed to *Roman* Lawes,) might be the better acquainted with, and subject to them:

Observator.

"*The Trans-Rhine (which*
"*are the true, and proper*
"*Germanes, for the most*
"*greatest part, were never*
"*Conquer'd by the Romans*
"*but retain'd (sans mixture)*
"*their own Language, and*
"*Manners, till, under Lo-*
"tharius, *they voluntarily*
"*submitted to the Roman*
"*Yoak. You shall find more*
"*Germane Families in* Italy,
"*then Roman Families in*
"Germany.

2. Colonies are best made up of Citizens bred up in the Metropolis of the Kingdome or in the Neighbouring Towns:

Towns: for example either of Romans or Latines; and because so many be planted, as will be able to defend the Province [and any Enemy whatever]

3. If Colonies be sent from a Free-State, it is good to build their Cities on the tops of the Hills, for defence of their Liberty: if from a Monarch, better in the Plain.

4. That Cities may wax great, 'tis expedient they be Situate [either] upon the Banks of Rivers, or [neare] the Sea-shore, and in a Plain; Where necessaries for life are easiest to be had: & commerce with strangers is most convenient: But, for the Defence of Liberty and Lawes, and the Non-impayring of Valour, they are more commodiously

ſeated upon Mountaines and Rocks. Withall great reſpect is to be had to the wholeſomneſſe of Water and Air, and Winds, and the Proſpect to the ſeverall Quarters of the Heavens.

5. Planters of Colonies are to be divided ——

into
1. Governors: as Prieſts and Judges.
2. Protectors: as Souldiers and Commanders.
3. Artizans: and ſuch as * feed the Republique.
As Husbandmen, Shepherds, and the like.

* *Nutritios*] *Reip. L.*

Obſervator.

"*Nothing hinders but he*
"*that Uſes Husbandry*
"*may alſo follow a Trade, either*

either by himſelfe, or his Wife

Rules that preſcribe exact proportions of allowances for every perſon in a Plantation, do often faile in the Pratique.

Plaines bear moſt Corn, Mountaines moſt Wool, *&c.* Hence came Chaffering, and Exchanging and Merchandizing, and ſtamping of Coynes, *&c.* and for want of Souldery [hereupon] were Forts, and Guns invented.

CHAP. VII.

Of the instruments to gain & keep Kingdomes, &c.

TO gain, keep and gover Kingdomes, there a three [principall] instrument

The { 1. Tongue, 2. Sword, 3. Treasure.

1. For the Tongue; tis th instrument of { Religion, an Prudence.

That is, of the Goods of th Minde.

2. The sword is the [pro per] Instrument of the Bod and its Goods.

3. Treasure is more [the In strument] of Fortunes, an Estates: which serves the Bo

ly and Minde [onely] Secondarily: but the true Instruments are the Tongue and the Sword.

2. They that use the sword only, founding their power upon that, those quickly lose their dominion; as *Tamberlaine*, *Attila*, and *Brennus*, and most of the Northern nations.

The Jesuites in *Japan* gaine [first] soules, then Kingdomes to *Spaine* and the Papacy, by their tongues.

There be that gaine Dominion by crying up some new sect, built upon some specious colour of truth, by sowing discord betwixt the old Religion, & the new Sect, which shall be attempted and fitted to the gust and palate of the multitude: But such Dominion is of it selfe not very long liv'd. Ring-

Ring-leaders of Heresies although [commonly] they gain much, they keep little as for example, *John* of *Leydon*, *Dulcinus* & *Theuda*

Observat.

"John *of* Leydon *was a* "*ignorant fellow, a person* "*of no worth at all, who* "*through the hatred against* "*the Priests of his time (whose* "*lives were abominable in the* "*eyes of all men) gathered to-* "*gether a rabble of the baser* "*people.*

They that use well the sword and tongue, do lay the foundations of durable Dominion; but then the sword must be just, and the tongue veracious. Thus did *Moses* build the Empire of the Jews, [namely, in veracity and justice,] which impious *Machiavell*

Part 2.

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The
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Thus
Tunis
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additio
ies.
befell
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vell never took into consideration. *p.* 147.

The Law of *Moiſes* ſurvived the Empire of the Jews, but *Mahomets* Laws ſhall ſink with his Empire: Thus fell the laws of *Alexander* with his perſon and power; Thus *Numa's*, *Belus*, and *Minos*, *Pythagoras*, and *Zamolxis* his lawes are extinct, even for want of juſtice and veracity. He, that knows not how to give lawes to thoſe he conquers, doth quickly loſe the Kingdome he has gain'd. Thus *Charles* the fifth loſt *Tunis* and *Germany* which he had wonne, for want of skill to ſecure his conqueſt by the addition of Lawes and Colonies. This misfortune often befell King *Pirrhus*; but not to the Romans.

Obſer-

Obſerv.

cc *He had need be a very*
cc *wiſe man, that can give*
cc *lawes to men of a different*
cc *Religion, that ſhal be laſting*
cc *and fitted to the diſpoſition*
cc *of them that receive them,*
cc *as it appears by the Romans*
cc *in* Jewry, *who did the ut-*
cc *moſt of their endeavour, &*
cc *with all their skill ſtrived,*
cc *to eſtabliſh the ſtate and*
cc *tranquility of that untracta-*
cc *ble people, by lawes, conforme*
cc *to their tempers and humors,*
cc *as the excellent orations of*
cc *King* Agrippa, *and* Joſephus
cc *made to their Countrymen,*
[*the Jews*] *do witneſſe.*

5. he that defends his Dominions by ſword and tongue, preſerves them better and more ſafely, then he that makes uſe but of onely one. For

6. Men

6. Men of Arts are [usually] oppressed by Men of Armes. Thus *Saturn* (being a Priest, as antient Kings were) left his Kingdome to *Jupiter*; and *Perseus* the Warriour, dethron'd *Atlas* the [Scholler and] Astrologer: Thus was *Pythagoras* supported by souldiers; and the Pope, till such time as he felt the use of his weapons, was often made a prey to his enemies, and many times (good man) to his friends.

* *Of Crotona.*

Observator.

"*Here the thrice worthy* Grotius, *notes well upon this* "*late passage, concerning the* "*Bishop of* Rome; *that the* "*benigne aspects of opportuni-*"*ty, made way for that power which the Pope now enjoyes: as* "*for instance, the Christian*

"*World*

"*World split into many petty*
"*Kingdomes*, Italy *torn in*
"*pieces, and sluggish with-*
"*all: an age too dull to ap-*
"*prehend the meaning of that*
"*Artifice in due time, and*
"*diverse other causes, which*
"*you may find in* Guicciardin,
and Machiavell.

7. He that uses only Armes for the defence of his Empire, and neglects witt and eloquence, makes but a paper building, rules but weakly: and this is the reason why the Emperor of *Germany* prevailes no more, having a people of different perswasions in Religion to rule over: and usually such Princes become a prey to those that make the best use of their witts. Hence came it that the Popes did so frequently make and un-make

Emp

Emperors at their pleasure. Therefore (as *Salust* observes) did the Romans [wisely] ever exercise both mind and body together. For,

He that exerciseth both, makes his Empire last longest, as the King of the Turkes, and Abassines, and the Duke of *Muscovy*. Fabulous Philosophy affirms as much, whiles it gives *Pallas* (the Goddesse of wisdome) a Book and a Spear to make her invincible; but to *Mars* only Armour, who (as the Poets sings) was therefore often Conquered. Hence was it that *Dux. Lat.*

9. The Northern Nations that fell like swarms of Bees upon the Southern Regions, who excell'd them in religion and Policy, received Laws from them they had conquered:

ed: So the Tartars and th
Turks a Northern people, ha
lawes from the conquered A
rabians, and Religion too
and the Hunns, Vandal
Lombards, and Goths, fro
the Romans, whose Territo
ries they had invaded.

Here the observator just
"*gives a check to the Auth*
"*and saies that,*

"*Both the Goths that ru*
"*in* Italy *and* Spain, *and t*
"*Vandals in* Africk, *to alien*
"*and estrange the minds*
"*their own people from t*
Romans, Jeroboam-*like*, e
"*d. avoured with barbar*
"*cruelties to promote the A*
"*rian Heresie, by all possib*
"*means they could.*

10. God that he migh
plant Religion and Learnin
among the Northern peopl

nd Armes and Numbers a-
ongſt the Southern, did of-
n make an enterchange, and
ngrafted them one into an
her, like Plants to make
m the more generous; but
both deſtroyed the degene-
ous Plants from the ſonnes
Japhet: Empires deſcended
om *Sem*, Prieſthood and
aws from *Cham*, Servants,
nd as the Author (but mi-
akingly) affirms, Tyrants;
for (as the obſervator notes)
the greateſt Tyrants that
ever were, came rather out
of Aſia, *then* Africa, *which*
was Chams *portion.*

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the causes of policies, and first of the first cause, God and Religion.

THere are three causes (if we speak politically) which found and govern Empires, that is
1. God.
2. Prudence.
3. Occasion.

But in some, one is more evident then the other. As

In the Kingdome of the Jews, God was most evident; in that of the Romans Prudence; in that of the Spaniard occasion: albeit (to speak Physically) God is the cause of all causes.

2. All Dominations (except impious *Machiavels*) ha

confeſſed, that prudence hath not power ſufficient to foreſee the good and evill, which all waies and in all things do await them: Therefore did all Nations fly to God, ſome by ſtraight, others by a crooked way, Therefore,

The Aſſyrian, Ægyptian, and Perſian Kings, conſulted the will and pleaſure of God, and implored his ayde, by Aſtrology in the ſtarres: The Greeks by Oracles of the Sibylls: The Romans by ſoothſaying and Auguries, whom the Braſilians do but a little excede from: but the *Chriſtians* in a direct path [ſeek God] and fly to the ſpirit of God in his Prophets, and councellors, and his Miniſtry.

* *Vicarium, &c. Papam.*

3. Every Princedome is protected by its own proper Angell,

Angell, and every Law as it
good is from God, neither c
their be any Law eſtabliſhe
which is void of all good;
Divines and Nature teach u

4. The Prieſthood ſuppli
the place of God in every D
minion, and therefore
Common-wealth, no aſſe
bly of men, either was, or c
be, without a Prieſthood, b
cauſe not without God.

5. Prieſts ought to be wi
but rather in contemplati
then practicalls; Valiant, b
moſt in ſuffering; ſober, li
rall, ingenious, true, not
ing ſo much as in jeaſt, fai
full, cheerfull, but enclin
more to auſterity, then ſe
rillity; gentle, prone rather
meekneſſe then Ruſticity
whoſe Character ſhould
Piety, Wiſdome, Charitie

nd tender-heartedneſſe, with-
ut hypocriſie.

Prieſts conſult what is to
e done, Rulers command that
o be done, which is contem-
lated or couſidered, and
uldiers and artificers put
ommands and conſultations
execution.

6. Religion ever ought to
had in high eſteem and ve-
ration, not in vulgar and
an account.

7. The Prieſthood ought
t to be proſtitute to the
ople, leſt it loſe its honour
d reverence.

Therefore *Ariſtotle*, no leſs
norantly then impiouſly,
ould make old Souldiers
ieſts. *Here the Author*
ts the foole upon the Calvi-
ſts (under which notion he
prehends the worſt of
Schiſma-

Schismatic's) who (saith he both all and some, count themselves Priests, which the famous Observator *here seems to prove, to defend, out of place (with reverence be it spoken) mis-urged both out of the Scripture and Fathers, in defence of common or universall* Unction, *and (by an injurious Concession) makes the Calvinists guilty of the Schismatique Phrensies: whereas 'tis most evident, both out of* Calvin *and* Beza, *in their severall discourses, and conflicts with the Antiministeriall Enthusiasts, that they were quite of another temper, and opinion; even bearing high for an Ordinary Ministry: though they brought not clean, or Primitive hands to that great Work.*

8. That Religion which
con-

contradicts Naturall Policy, ought not to be retained. Therefore the *Maccabees* in time of neceſſity taught, that Warre might be piouſly made on the Sabbath day, when the *Jewes* under *Pompey* and *Antiochus* (being that day aſſailed) not defending themſelves, periſhed. God gives no Law to his People, [whereby his People ſhould be deſtroyed] which is oppoſite to their own being.

Obſervator.

Rituall Lawes, do eaſily give place to Occaſions, and Times: whence comes the Hebrew Proverb: The life endanger'd, violates the Sabbath: and that [other] The Sabbath was given into the hands of man, and not man into the Hands of the

"*Sabbath*: Yet the foolish glos
"of some Jewes was such
"that some of them kep
"themselves in the self sam
"Posture, both night and da
"and therefore paid dear f
"their Superstition; bein
"not onely by Pompey, but b
"Nebuchadnezzar, Sossius,
"and Titus, taken Captiv
"upon the *Sabbath* day.

9. The Doctrine of fata
Necessity is pernicious, in, an
to Commonwealths: for
makes Subjects seditious, an
Princes Tyrannous: bot
pleading *Necessity* for t
Mischief they *Act*: and thi
much *Cicero* acknowledge
But

10. This Doctrine of *N*
cessity does no hurt among t
Turks, because they are rud
and illiterate, and are ke
with

within compaſſe by force, not by Law. But in *Italy*, where they are a ſharp witted People, it would make them ſtark mad, and all turne Libertines, and lay all their ſinns upon Gods ſcore, as the Author of all Evill: but above all, it would make their Princes Tyrants, in Imitation (forſooth!) of God, craftily imputing their own offences to their ſubjects, that they might [God-like] Torment them, to their owne glory: Then which, what can bee more deſtructive to a Commonwealth?

11. Sophiſticall Sciences that thwart Religion, ought to be Baniſh'd the Commonwealth: as *Plato* teacheth.

Ariſtotle his School, did the *Jewes* much miſchiefe,

under *Antiochus*; and now to Christians: as *Averroes* did too, both to us, and his own Saracens. See *S. Vincentius* [*Lirinensis*,]

Observat.

"*What is spoken here of* "Aristotle *does very well a-* "*gree with the opinion of the* "*antient Christians. In whose* "*Iudgement* Aristotle *was ac-* "*counted Impious. In the* "*judgement of all the Greeks,* "*and* (*amongst the Latines*) "*Saint* Austin, Plato's *Phi-* "*losophy is more consonant to* "*Christianity*: Aristotle *com-* "*ing but very lately into* "*esteeme, and reputation,* "*with the World.*

Animadversions.

What the Fryer, or Grotius *affirme of* Aristotle *is onely true, Accidentally,* & Viti

Utentis

Utentis: *and so all the Sect of Philosophers fall* (*as well as* Aristotle) *under* Tertullians *Character, that they are* PATRIARCHS *of* HERETIQUES: *but I am clearly of opinion, that* Plato's *Idea's in the head of an* ENTHUSIAST, *or* NATIONAL THEOLOGUE, *have done much more hurt to Christianity, then* Aristotles *subtleties ever did: who being* (*as himself justly boasts*) *the Father of Syllogisme, and the first discoverer of Fallacy, might advance all Truths* (*both Natural, Morall, and Sacred*) *more,* (*did not men abuse him to Sophisticall ends*) *then all the whole* RACE *of Philosophers ever did, or will do.*

12. Religion that is repug-

nant to common Policy, although it be beneficiall to one particular City or Province, is subject to a change, or Reformation: and therefore cannot last long, as the decree of *Moyses*, about the choise meates: and the Apostles, of abstaining from Idols, and things strangled.

1. There are therefore some *Lawes*, convenient for time, and Place, [and Person] as abstinence from swines flesh, for the *Jewes*, subject to Leprosie

2. Other Lawes are eternall, profitable for all Nations: as to Honour our Parents.

3. Some againe are pernicious to all places, and times: as that a man doth sin by destiny, and does profit in any thing

hing without liberty [in ſome degree] of his own Wil.

Obſervator.

" *Here* Grotius *affirmes* " *that the Law of not eating* " *Swines fleſh is of ſo long con-* " *tinuance, that it not onely* " *remaines in uſe amongſt* " *the* Jewes *at this day,* " *but with the* Mahometan " *Arabians, and Abaſsin* " *Chriſtians: and not without* " *good cauſe: for that food in* " *thoſe Regions begets the* " *Scab.*

" *As for that antient cu-* " *ſtom of abſtaining from blood* " *and ſtrangled things, it* " *was a long time obſerved* " *by the Chriſtians, either out* " *of hope to gaine the* Jewes, " *or out of Reverence to An-* " *tiquity: and that it has no-*

"*thing in it contrary to Re-*
"*publiques, or Communities,*
"*the continued observation of*
"*it, through Christian*
"Greece, *and all the* East,
"*and the Edict of* Leo *the*
"*Emperor, make evident.*

13. All Religions and Sects have their proper Circles and Revolutions; as Republiques have from Monarchy into Tyranny: thence into *Aristocracy*, thence into *Oligarchy*, from that into a *Polity*, and so into a *Democracy*; and then revert back again into *Monarchy* at last: either by the same, or some other Track.

So, when *Sects* arrive at *Atheisme*, the very Extremes of all mischiefe fall upon the Peoples head: and the fiercenesse of Gods wrath breaks in upon them: upon which, (but through

through many affections) the y return to their Priſtine good Condition.

But when once they come to that paſſe, that they deny the Providence of God, and the Immortality of the ſoule, they muſt needs ſuffer either an [abſolute] change, or a Reformation: becauſe the Curb of Conſcience is taken out of the peoples mouth: and ſo being themſelves wicked, they become a prey to no leſſe wicked Princes: and thereupon; tyred with evils paſt, they gladly embrace any Lawgiver, whether hee be good or bad.

14. The *Sects* of Philoſophers, paſſed not from one opinion to an other, any further then *Epicurus*: and there they ſtopt: who denying

God, and Providence, all their *Sects* were utterly destroy'd, as *Laertius* [excellently] obſerves.

The Religion eſtabliſhed by *Moyſes*, when once the Sadduces crept in, that denyed the Immortality of the Soul, ſuffer'd a Reformation by our Lord *CHRIST* * who brought immortality to all our ſoules.

* *The Lat. is ambiguous.*

When the Gentiles fell into down-right Atheiſm, they fell into a world of miſeries: as appears under the Romane Emperors: whoſe lawleſſe Licentiouſneſſe marr'd all: as *Cato* in *Saluſt*, and *Lucan*, the Poet, obſerve.

The *Sect* of the *Libertines*, that held ſin to be no ſin, ſprung out of the Calviniſts, as the Author (but moſt

ſlande-

ſlanderouſly) affirmes.

Moſt of the *Tranſylvanians*, deny the Immortality of the Soul, and the Holy Trinity.

That moſt impious Book of the three Impoſtors, the Fryer would gladly faſten alſo upon the Reformed Churches: "But, as *Grotius* notes, it "was Father'd long ſince up- "on the Emperor *Frederick* "the ſecond: but adds with- all, that hee never ſaw the man, that ſaw that Book. *Add.*

15. *The Author* (*as it becomes a Fryer to do*, Ex Officio) *Pleades high for the Temporall ſword of the Pope, and an armed Prieſthood*: affirming that the great *Turk*, the King of *Perſia*, *Tartarie*, *Moors*, and the King of *Fez*, living all under an unarmed, naked Prieſthood, are, by that meanes

meanes, ſplit into ſo many Hereticall opinions: whereas the Kings of *France*, *Spain*, *Germany*, and the Republique of *Venice*, and [many] other potent Princes united in one Religion under an armed Prieſt, the Pope, have no Hereſies ſtarted amongſt them, but with manifeſt hazard of their Crownes and Kingdomes.

Obſervator.

"*The Sophie* [*of* Perſia] "*after many years, began to* "*innovate ſome thing in the* "*rites of Prayer and Faſting:* "*& made white hats (or Tur-* "*bants) for the Cognizance* "*of his Faction:* —— *But at* "*long running, the Poſterity* "*of this Sophy, by pretences* "*of Sanctity, ſo bewitch'd the* "*people, that in the end, they*

Tranſla-

"*Translated the Crown of*
"Persia *from the Assumbeian*
"*Kings, to their own.*

16. & 17. "*These two Pa-*
"*ragraphs, savour altogether*
"*of the Cell, and the Cowle:*
"*asserting the necessity, (at*
"*conveniency) of the Papall*
"*Power, in Temporalls, over*
"*Christian Princes.* Because (saies he) The Pope

1. Poyzes the differences of Christendome, being Umpire of Peace and War.

2. That he [alwaies] takes part with those that suffer wrong: neither permits he any King to invade an other Christian Kings Dominion.

3. Hee links and unites Christian Princes, against the [Common] Enemies of the Christian faith. And, *Cruciatus Lat.*

4. By his * Crusado's and In-

Indulgences and Excommunications, for good, and againſt evill Rulers, he does erect and defend the Chriſtian Commonwealth.

So that without that Pope (to ſpeak as a man, and Politiquely) Chriſtianity had, ere this, gone to utter ruine. And the Author adds his opinion (in fine) That all Chriſtian Princes, would be as one: ſecure from one an other, and from ſtrangers too, and bee alwaies Victorious: would they but once make one Grand *Senate* at *Rome*. And that the reaſon why never any one Prince could attain an Univerſall Monarchy, over the reſt of Chriſtian Princes, was no other, then the Temporall Power of his Holineſſe; which was a Curb in their mouths.

But

But (ſaies hee in the cloſe of all) 'Tis likely that the Monarchy of *Chriſtendom*, will by little, and little, fall totally into the Popes hands.

The Obſervator anſwers thus, to theſe two Paragraphs.

"*He that, with care and* "*diligence, will look into* "*ſtory, ſhall find that* [*farre*] "*more Warrs have been rai-* "*ſed amongſt Chriſtians by* "*the Popes of* Rome, *then* "*have been compoſed. But ſo* "*farr is it from them, that* "*they either could or would* "*oppoſe themſelves againſt* "*the* Spaniard (*that glutton* "*of Empires*) *that, on the* "*contrary, the Papall Au-* "*thority* [*alwaies*] *gave* "*colour and countenance to* "*the Spaniſh avarice; as* Na-

varre

cc varre can [ſadly] witneſſe:
cc and France, in the times
cc of Henry the third. And
cc lately, with moſt notorious
cc injuſtice, Armes were raiſed
cc againſt the Duke of Mantua;
cc yet would he receive no
cc Aſſiſtance at all from the
cc Pope, although no bad man.
cc The Papall [Bulls and]
cc Edicts if they availe any
cc thing at all, it is with ſuch
cc as are not able to reſiſt
cc them. They catch poor flyes,
cc but Eagles break through
cc them.

cc That Chriſtendom fell not
cc long ſince into the hands of
cc an Univerſall Monarch, it
cc was no thanks to the Papall
cc Power, that hindred it: but
cc the Germanes were hindred
cc by their own Diſcords, and
cc Germany hindred France,

and

and France Spain, *just as the Persian and Tartar keep the Turk* [*from being Emperor of the World.*]

18. *Charles* the great, and *Constantine* declared themselves *Defenders* of the Pope; but *Henry* and *Frederick* enemies: for under *Frederick* those pernicious factions of *Guelfes* & *Gibellines* (that is, *Imperialists*, and *Pontificians*) arose in *Italy*.

Julian [the Apostat] endeavoured to make Gentilisme and Judaisme æmulate one the other, and vie for the Mastery, but perished under the attempt.

The Mahometan Sect has many defects in it.

First, because if their armes faile, they fall.

2. Because it admitts not of divers Princes. 3. Because

3. Becauſe in many things it oppoſes God. And

4. Becauſe it is as a place of torture to all its enemies.

The Duke of *Muſcovy* (a Country aſſailed by no man) defends himſelfe by his ſcituation and ſchiſme; and ſtands rather by the diſcords of Chriſtendome, then upon his own bottom, as inc'e:d the Turk himſelfe partly doth.

"Charles *the fifth, was a*
"*man that bid faireſt for the*
"Univerſall Monarchy. *When*
"Conſtantius *countenanced*
"*the Arians, and* Julian
"*Paganiſme, the Pope was*
"*not a man in power, had no*
"*dominion then. Here therefore*
"*then is an error* [*or fallacy*]
"*of no cauſe, put for a cauſe.*

Here in this Paragraph, the fryar ſeems to dream of the

retur

turn of a Golden age, *of nocence, under one* (*I know t what*) Monarch *of all, as* dam *was at first, and ſeems point at the* Spaniard *for e man: the Obſervator ſuſ- cts ſome poiſon here; but I link there is much more va- ty then venome.*

20. That the world may governed by one man, the mpire of *Auguſtus* does rtly prove it.

That the Spaniard does le the 2 Hemiſphears by Re- gion, which is the very ſoule an Empire, and Dominion, ing all in the whole, and holly in every part.

21. If the World were go- ned by one man, as *Alex- nder* ſaid by one Sun, warres ould ceaſe, and Peſtilence, communication of Arts and

and Medicines, and by transmigration from infected into wholesome ayre: By the same transmigrations might Inundations and fire be avoided: so famine likewise might be averted, by transportation of provision from plentifull into needy Countries, &c.

Animad.

These are but the fumes of fancies of an idle braine, doting upon the Spanish interest and the Papall; and so I dismisse them proceeding to

CHAP. IX.

Of the second cause of gaining and governing Kingdomes which is prudence.

A Monarchy is fitter to gain a Common-wealth the

hen to conſerve Dominion.

Monarchy is ſooner de-
raved then many Rulers.
Crotius *confeſſes then a few as Oligarchy) which I un-
rſtand not; neither of them
ives their reaſon, nor I my
ſent.* The *Obſervator* adds.
"*For duration, no Common-
wealth in the world is worth
the naming, but the* Veneti-
an: *and yet the* Egyptian, Aſſyrian, & *French *Kingdomes have laſted longer then that.*

* *Franco-rum Franks.*

Some are Kings

1. By Nature Rationall [as it were Kings of wiſdome] as { *Socrates* and *Cato.*
2. By Fortitude, as { *Domitian* and *Vitellius.*
3. By both, as { *Alexander.* *Auguſtus.* and *David.*

4. More by Nature then Fortune, as { *Scipio*, and *Hannibal*
5. More by Fortune then Nature, as { *Tiberius* & *Galb*

3. Prudence (the secon cause of Dominion) does pr perly belong to those that a truely Kings ; and to suc next under God, is *Domini* due, which prudence is direct ly opposite to *Craft* or *Sub tlety*, which is proper only t *Machiavels Tyrant*.

Prudence is consonant t God, that is to eternall wis dome.

Craft agrees to nothing bu a mans own will and pleasure that is, acts all Arbitrarily.

Prudence is magnanimous Craft base, yet proud.

Prudence [alwaies] advan ces wise and valiant men, an puts them in place of powe and

nd truſt. Craft depreſſes and
eſtroyes them, that ſhe may
ule over Baſtard-Subjects,
hen the Legitimate are cut
ff.

Prudence treaſures up riches
r the good of mens ſouls and
hat their numbers may en-
reaſe: Craft aymes at money
nd ſtrong holds, and rejoyces
the Diminution and leſſen-
g of her ſubjects.

Prudence even in loſing con-
uers, Craft by conquering is
loſer.

Prudence is mercifull, Craft
cruell.

Prudence is that of prin-
ipall men and Chieftaines,
ich as *Ceſar*, craft belongs to
vile perſons, ſuch as *Dævus*.

Prudence has an eye to the
tern, but Craft to the Oare.

Prudence makes Lawes for
every

every mans good, but Craft only for her own.

Prudence punishes, and gains good-will by it, and makes subjects the better; Craft punishes and becomes odious, and the people the worse for't. It is proper to magnanimity and valour, to gain Dominions, as to *Cesar*, and *Charles* the fifth; but to justice and temperance to preserve them, as to the *Venetians*: and he that is adorned with all vertues, is fit for both, as *Augustus*.

5. He that acquires Dominions, must have such a Prudence as is magnanimous, stout, liberall, just, &c. but somewhat inclining to pride, boldnesse, prodigality; but severity mixt with it, &c.

He that keepes and preserves Domi-

ominions, must have the
me prudence, but inclining
Pusillanimity, to fear,
enacity, and [some] Licen-
ousneſſe, *&c.*

6. Hee that gaines a King-
me, different from him in
eligion: must either Tran-
te the Seat of his Empire
ither: as the *Turk* did into
nſtantinople: or elſe Tran-
te the Inhabitants into an
her Region, as *Nebuchad-
zzar* did the *Jewes*, into
bylon: and plant new Co-
nies, in the Metropolitane
ties of the Conquer'd Pro-
ce; which ſhall be of thine
n Religion, and Laws; place
ew] Preachers there, change
ws, and bring down the
ief of the People; as *Cyrus*
in *Lydia*, and the *Spani-
rd* in *America*: But if they

will buckle to thy Religion
thou maist make them Artist
and Mechanicks, serviceable
thy Colony: if not, doo
them to slavery, and Tran
plant them farre enough [
sure] from thy seat Imper
all.

But if they embrace th
same Religion with thee (
the *Neapolitanes* with th
Spaniards) treat them gentl
receive them into Comm
friendship, and change n
their Customes, nor Politi
but by degrees: let the Supre
Judges be made out of thi
own men; the inferiour out
theirs. If they did violently o
pose thine entrance, Levell t
Peers, with the People: but
they did receive thee as frien
Transplant them out of th
Native soyle, and drill the
wit

ith Ho
romot
ot the
nd:
ow in
ty, ar
o the P
bell. E
us an
ll the
in'd,
are, le
nd, y
by th
] pre
racie
alien
at up
ey wi
7. He
ing do
e mis
o strik
wes,

ith Honors, Rewards, and
romotions; but be ſure let
ot the chief heads be left be-
ind: for they will either
row inſolent, upon Familia-
ity, and render thee odious
o the People, or elſe they will
ebell. By theſe defects, *Pyr-
hus* and *Charles* the fifth, loſt
ll the Provinces they had
ain'd, on a ſuddain. But be-
are, leſt by Calumnies, and
aud, you depreſſe any man;
r by that meanes you [on-
] prepare Ruine and Con-
iracies againſt your ſelf; and
alienate their Affections,
at upon the leaſt occaſion,
ey will rebell againſt you.

7. He that invades an others
ingdome, muſt not ſtick at
e miſchiefs following. *viz.*
o ſtrike at the Head, change
awes, pull down Forts, and

Castles; Extinguish the Blood-Royall, or Translate it.

Animad.

This savours of Machiavel *whom the Fryer so much detests: or (which is worse) of the Jesuit.*

8. A Prince should be known to do no evill, except that of punishment: and that too, such as the People wish: as to Fleece Usurers, and ravenous Magistrates, to banish Superfluous, and effeminate Arts: doom the sluggish to the Oare: to punish Adultery, Pride, and all Enormous sins and sinners.

9. The People are kept in obedience, by [plenty of Provisions, Souldiers by good Pay: Nobles by Honors.

10. For the advance, and encrease of Republiques, and

King-

Kingdomes; these Rules following are to be observed.

1. All persons must take upon them those Functions and callings, for which Nature has fitted them.

2. Magistrates are to be chosen, rather by Nature then Fortune.

3. The greater good is ever to be preferred before the lesse, and the Common before the Private.

4. Let there be a free Community of Goods, of Knowledge, and of Religion.

5. Foment the Emulations of aspiring to Honors, by Vertue.

6. Preferre ever Divine things before Humane.

7. Let every man learn this Logick. *viz.* That God is: *Ergo*, He is wise, and good:

Ergo, He has a tender care over us: *Ergo*, he is just: And we are his Children, and therefore after death, will reward or punish us. If this be not so, *Ergo*, God is not just, not good, *Ergo*, neither is he God: The contrary whereof; All Nature, the Fabrick of the Universe, and its severall Parts, and the use, Order and function of each Particle of it, do wonderfully [and loudly] proclaim. As also his revealing himselfe to his Saints [on Earth] Angells, and Devills, and Policies, and all Sciences in the World, [confessing it.]

CHAP

CHAP. X.

Of the third Cause, &c. viz. Occasion.

THE occasions of acquiring Dominion, are innumerable. But the chief are,

1. Thine own Valour, and numbers; and the Imbecillity of thine Enemies, and their Associates.

2. The Division of the Province to be surprized, into petty Kings, or jarring Republiques; but especially into various *Sects*, and Schisms.

3. But most of all, if any man call thee in, for his Protectour.

4. If the Rulers Son be in his Minority.

5. If the Ruler be hated of his People.

6. If the People be covetous of change.

7. If the Nobles [or Patricians] may be bought and sold [*as those of* Rome *were in* Jugurths *daies.*]

8. If there be any *Interregnum*, &c.

9. All grosse and Enormous sins, and Vices, are so many Inlets, and doors for a Conqueror, to come in by: as Idolatry, and Anthropophagi above the rest.

CHAP. XI.

Of the Decay, Downfall, and Change of Monarchies: *and the cause and remedies thereof.*

1. ALL Monarchy dies, or sinks [at least] either

1. Through

1. Through want of Vertue in him that ſucceeds in it: ſo the *Aſſyrian* Monarchy ended in *Sardanapalus*. Or

2. For want of a Succeſſor; which evill *Auguſtus* prevented, by adopting Sons, to ſucceed him.

3. By Diviſion, or Diſcord of many ſucceſſors: ſo the Romane Monarchy under *Conſtantius*, became a Dyarchy under *Conſtantine*, and *Conſtance*, and afterwards, in *Arcadius* and *Honorius*, and the Spaniſh Monarchy was Rivall'd by *Alonzo*, *Ferdinand*, and *Sanctius*.

The *Turk* prevents this miſchief by killing his Brethren: but the King of *China* by baniſhing them into ſome Mountain: which the King of the *Abaſſines* does likewiſe.

4. Because the Kings Son is young and contemptible, as the Son of *Scanderbeg*, and *Antiochus*, and *Alexander* the Great: and the last Duke save one, of the line of *Sforza* Duke of *Millaine* who all being Minors and Pupills, were commited to Guardian Kinsmen, or Tutors, or strangers, and so, were either murther'd or deposed.

☞ 5. The Election of a King if it be made by Souldiers, is dangerous, and Schismatical because they are [easily] carried from one to another, in their affections. For,

☞ Souldiers are naturally a dull kind of People: and value them most, who pay them best, at present: not at all considering, the Publique good as it happen'd in the times of *Galba*

Galba, Vitellius, Vespasian, and *Otho* in the Romane state; and under *Omri* in *Israel*: with very much dammage [to the Publique.]

6. Election also made by all the People, is dangerous: for they understand not the deep designes, of hidden, and disguised Tyrants: but are distracted, and carried away with smooth Orators, whithersoever they please to lead them. Besides, the People are ever at odds, with one another, and alwaies changing opinions. Hereupon *Florence* by such Popular Elections, sustained a world of dammage, and prejudice. Neither does the Populacy confide in their Nobles, but call in strangers to pacifie their Tumults; So the Florentines call'd

call'd in the Commander of *Athens*: by whom, they were more devour'd then before.

The remedy is: if onely the heads of Families be summon'd to Election: but this is a weak one.

7. Elections are best made by a prudent Senate: out of the body of the Senate it self; as the Pope, out of the Conclave of Cardinalls.

8. If an Election suffer a Schism in it, or Fracture, *viz.* an *Interregnum* (or as they cal it) a *Vacant* See, the Empire may go to wrack; and therefore the *Germane* Emperor doth make choice of his Successor before his death; as also the King of *Fez*, before he dies, advances one of his own Sons into his Throne.

Observat.

Observat.

"*It often falls out otherwise: for the Romane Emperour of time dies and appoints no Successor: and the* Polack *cannot endure any such thing should be done in that Kingdom.*

9. The best is not alwaies elected: but he whom the dying King loves best: as *Solomon* chose *Rehoboam.*

Observat.

"*The odd number ever does best in Elections: and therfore the King of* Bohemia "*was superadded to the six old Electors of* Germany.

10. A Monarchy may bee ruin'd likewise, by the insolency and pravity of a mans Children [*as in Tarquin the proud*] or of his wife: who often hates the best deserving men:

men: as *Sophia*, the Wife of *Justinian* the Emperor, hated *Narses* [*the Gallant Eunuch*] who therefore call'd in the *Lombards* into *Italy*, to the hazard of the whole Empire.

☞ 11. Monarchy may be in danger also, and be ruin'd by the Authority of some Prophet, or [bold Popular] Preacher: that dares cry it down. "*The instance here is* "*made in* Samuel, *and the* "*Pope: which is an handsome* "*comparison indeed. Here the* "*Fryer draws the Curtain,* "*and laies open the whole* "*scene of the Popes Encroach-* "*ments upon Temporall Prin-* "*ces: which part I leave the* "*Fryer to Act by himself, and* "*thither referre the Reader*: only he tells us (*pag.* 198.) that never any Prince prof-

per'd

pered that opposed his Holineſſe, but fell at laſt; as *Frederick* of *Swevia*, *Roger Guiſcand*, &c. Yet

Some Princes call'd a councell againſt *Julius* the ſecond, and Pope *Eugenius* the fourth.

All Clergy-men (under the Papacy) love the Pope in their heart, Princes only for preferment. Armed Religion was alwaies *Invincible*; *Vid. animad. ſupr.*

It is better for a Prince to yeeld to the Prieſt, as *Theodoſius* did to *Ambroſe*, then to treat him ill, as *Eudoxa* did *Chryſoſtome*; For he was confirmed in his Throne, whereas ſhe dyed an infamous death.

12. Diviſion in Religion, albeit Monarchy be not preached downe, does deſtroy it,

☞ it, as it appears in *France*, *Germany*, and *Poland*, &c. for it divides mens minds; and therefore both their bodies, and fortunes, and armes, and both parties hate the King: The evill, becauſe he favours the good, and the good, becauſe he does not extinguiſh the evill.

Obſer.

Here Grotius (*the greateſt advocate and favourer of toleration that lived in our age*) *oppoſes the Fryar, and affirms,* "*That there does not upon* "*difference in opinions, ſeem* "*ſo much hazard of divulſi-*
"*on* (*as he calls it*) *of minds,*
"*or animoſity amongſt men, if*
"*the* Magiſtrate *would compell*
"*the* Miniſtry *to forbear mu-*
"*tuall and publique railings,*
"*and refutations one of ano-*
"*ther*

Condemnationes Lat.

"*ther, and if by a publique*
"*Law of State, every man*
"*might be ſecure in the uſe*
"*and exerciſe of his own re-*
"*ligion, as it is in* Japan *and*
"Poland; *which liberty the*
"*reformed Churches of* France
"*being abridged of, Tumults*
"*and Warrs, were occaſioned*
"*by it.*

13. A *Monarchy* alſo failes by its own vaſtneſſe and bulk, for which reaſon it cannot [well] be governed by *One*, and he is therefore faine to call to his aſſiſtance ſome to lend their ſhoulders to this great burthen, who afterwards will admitt no ſuperiours, and ſo ſhare the government; as we have often ſeen it fall out in the Roman Empire.

The Remedy for this is, to keep an Empire within its own

own bounds, lest the commanders and governors, being at too great a distance, usurpe the Dominion: As the Monarch of *Japan* [is a great example of this] who never sets foot beyond his sixty six Kingdomes; and the King of *China* can* claime nothing beyond those bounds which he hath set himselfe, by walls and Rocks, Woods, and Seas. Another remedy for this disease is, for a Prince to keep the Wives and Children of Governors and Provincialls [abroad] at home with him [as pledges] and engage them by Oath to Fidelity and Allegiance, &c. which in part the King of *Spain* observes.

*or posses

14. Sometimes a Kingdom's lost for want of provisions, because it has no fruitfull soyle about

bout it: This is the condi-
ion of *Genoa*, and *Venice*, and
herefore they provide againſt
his [miſchief] by Merchants
nd Factors, and exchangers
f commodities, by Granaries,
unitions, &c.

15. A Monarchy may al-
o fall by *Peſtilence*; againſt
hich, the King of the *Abaſ-*
ines has provided a movable
ity, and ſo removes his
eat at pleaſure for the bene-
t of wholeſomer Ayre; which
ing the Tartars [now] and
retofore the *Veientes* ob-
rved; nay the very Birds do
e ſame: But with us there
Officers for health purpoſe-
appointed, which the Au-
or calls *Magiſtratus Sani-*
tis, like our Maſters of the
ſt-houſes

*Civitatem portat idem. L.

16. A Monarchy likewiſe is
ruin'd

ruined by invasion of forraign Princes, that over-power the right owner; as the King of *Persia* was by *Alexander* of *Macedon*; and the *Sultan* of *Ægypt* by *Selemus* the great *Turk*.

The best remedy against this, is the love of the subjects to their Prince, & their gallantry on his behalfe; next is, to procure a strong & ready Militia, and to enter into league with many Princes, that may over-power the Rivall of his Crown: as the *Macchabees* did with the Romans, being affraid of *Antiochus*, and the *Venetian* with the *French* when they fear'd the *Spaniard*. Neither is it amisse to sow seeds of discord and hatred amongst the powers you stand in fear of; as the Spaniard doe

loes betwixt the Turk and Persian, ths Abaſſine and Muſcovite, Polack and Tranſilvanian, all around, &c. and amongſt the Nobles of *France*, which is his Rivall.

When the *Nobility* grow too rich and potent, as the Nobles of *Iapan*, and often thoſe of *Naples*, and the French likewiſe and the German *Peers*, they have deſtroyed the Monarchy under which they lived, deſiring every one to live for himſelfe. The remedy for this is, to cut off Intailes *of Land & Honours*; the *Author* meaus in the words, *Ne feuda tranſeant ad Hæredes*, that they be not eſtabliſhed, as the Turk does. Next is to levell their Forts and ſtrong holds with the ground, or garriſon them with

with the Princes own ſouldiery, and then under pretence of advancing, to humble the Nobles.

18. A Kingdome may be loſt too, by the treachery of a Kings owne Souldiers, as it happened to *Antiochus.*

The remedy againſt this is, to keep them in their dutie by art and cunning, and divide them; and to fortifie thy ſelfe with a ſtrong guard of thy beſt friends, whom thou muſt oblige with perpetuall favours, and benefits, as the Turk does his *Janizaries.*

19. A Crown may be loſt by the ſuddain *incurſion* of Barbarous people.

The remedy againſt this is, to oppoſe wiſdome and religion to barbarous folly: So Pope *Leo* oppoſed *Attilla*

and

and *Jaddus* the high Prieſt in *Hieruſalem*, clad in his Prieſtly Robes, met, and adored, and ſo pacified *Alexander* the great.

20. A man may loſe his Kingdome too for want of Souldiery of his owne, and by entertaining too many Auxiliaries and Mercenary men; which was the ruine of *Lodovick Sforza*, Duke of *Millaine*, *&c.*

The Remedy of this is to have a choice Militia of thine owne alwaies in readineſſe; to arme and unite thine own men, but to diſarme and diſſipate the ſtrangers. For this reaſon alſo it is expedient, that none [of any Family] but the firſt-born inherit any eſtate, and let the reſt be made Souldiers; or elſe do as the Turks

Turk does, keep Schooles or Colledges of Cloiſtered boyes, to be trained up in *Military Diſcipline*, which ſhall know no other Father but the Monarch.

21. Sometimes a Kingdome is loſt after a *Victory*, by the inſolency of the Conquering Army; or after a truce [or league] as it happened to *Carthage* after the firſt punick warre, under *Hamilcar*.

The remedy for this is, on a ſudden to divide the Army into diſtant quarters: and not to be embodyed till the Generall commands.

22. A Kingdome may be loſt for want of preſent pay for the Souldiery, when the Warre is on foot, as it fell out to *Maximilian* of *Auſtria*.

Publique treaſuries are the beſt

best remedy against this. Besides the Rich (at such a pinch) are to be compell'd by Religion] *he meanes sure Anathema's and Terrors of Ecommunication*] and other Penalties, to throw all their Money and Plate into the Publique Treasury: For so, neither can they rebell, and hereby is the Kingdome confirm'd, and Established: which was usuall at *Rome*, and *Venice*. And it is lawfull too, in extreamity, to melt down Consecrate Church Plate: and to make the very Souldiers themselves part with their Gold to this publique purpose: but to sweeten them with fair hopes, and the Pillage of the Field. Thus did *Cæsar*, in the beginning of the Civill Warre: and thus did

Henry (*the third I take it*) King of *France* the Fr er advises too: to make leaden Coin (if need be) to be currant as long as the War shall last, as the *Venetians* have done.

23. Kingdomes are lost too, by the Luxury of the conquering Army, that does breake and effeminate it self: by the spoiles, and delicates of Conquer'd Provinces: as it fell out, to the *Lombards*, *Goths*, *Huns*, and *Gaules*; who possessing themselves of *Southern* Kingdomes, full of delights and pleasures. They [quickly] lost, both their strength and Empire: Which happen'd also to all Kings of *Naples*; by reason of the soft delicacies of Air, and Soyle. *Josuah* found out a good remedy

nedy for this; who would not quite extinguish all the Natives, [of *Canaan*] that his People might [still] have some body, whereon to whet, and exercise their Valour. So [*Scipio*] *Nasica* advis'd [the Romanes] not quite to destroy *Carthage*, lest *Rome* should grow effeminate [by losing her Rivall.]

24. By joyning in Commerce and Traffique, *&c.* with two potent Princes. Thus came the *Ragusean* to serve the *Turk*, and thus the *Genese*, to be under the *Spaniard*: but the [Wise] *Venetian* prevented this. For he would never put to Sea with the *Spaniard*; neither would he ever Traffique with him, nor hold any thing by way of Tenure or Homage, in the King of

Spains Dominions, [as the *Genoeſſe* and others do]

25. Heavy Taxes, and Impoſitions, often loſe Kingdomes, and enrage the People into Mutinies, and Rebellion; as it hapned in *Iſrael* under *Rehoboam*; and the Duke of *Alva* in *Flanders*.

26. The Cruelty of Provincialls: may be the loſſe of a Kingdom: which rule by pride and Avarice. This the Axe muſt cure, as *Caſar Borgia* did by *Orcus* of *Ceſena*.

Puniſhments muſt ever be exacted by the ſword, Tributes by the tongue; the Militia by both.

27. A Crown gain'd, may be loſt, if the Iſſue Royall find friends to help them to their right: as in the caſe of *Ioas*: who was eſtabliſh'd in his Throne

Throne by the high Priest: against *Athaliah* and her usurpation, *&c.*

28. A Kingdome may be lost by the conspiracy of strong and Potent men; as the *Tarquins* were Erected by *Brutus*, and *Lucretius*, and the *Magi* of *Persia* by *Darius* and his Complices.

Hidden Vertue in any man is a dangerous thing, especially if it be afraid of the Prince that rules: for it will at last break out to the Princes loss, if not Ruine: as it did in *Brutus* and his confederate. Valour and Light must be ever set high on a Candlestick. Smother'd Fire may do, and indeed ever does, most mischief.

Observat.

"*How dangerous it was for*

"Tiberius *to advance* Seianus [*himselfe a well born Person*] *to so great Honor: the Prince perceived and remedied: but not without hazard. Therefore both hee from that time forward and others, took a course to cast Honors upon meaner Persons: and those but Temporary.*

Animad.

"*This observation becomes a man born in a popular state: But God himselfe seems to make it a curse: when the Honorable person is over-top'd by mean fellowes.* Isa. 3. 1, 2. & 3.

* *He means.* Ehud & Eglon. Iud. 3. 6. 20. 21.

The conspiracy of one man with himselfe to murder a King, *&c.* is Inevitable, as that of *Adad* against the * King of *Edom*: and *Pausanias* against *Philip*

Philip of *Macedon*: and Frier *Clement* againſt *Henry* the third of *France*.

A conſpiracy of many is hardly to be avoided: Therefore Probity and the Peoples love[when all is done] is the ſtrongeſt Guard a Prince can have.

26. Laſtly, a Kingdome may be loſt, when the Subject are waſted by Warre: and ſo through want of Defendants, it lies open to Invaſion; as now (ſaies the Author) *Spaine* does.

Enfranchizing, or Endenization, is the onely cure for this diſeaſe: by admitting Forreigners into your Freedome: as the Romans did the Latines: and ſo fill up your number.

CHAP. XII.

Of the fall and change of Republiques where many Govern, &c.

1. TO take off the dissentions, between Peers, and People, the Author would have them all participate of Honors: as, at this time, it is amongst the Biscainers: Or, as amongst the Jewes, that one Family chosen out of all the rest should rule.

Observat.

"'Tis expedient, that betwixt the Peers, and the Plebeians, there should be a middle sort, and degree of Persons, as a Seminary of Nobility: such as were the Knights and Gentlemen of Rome

« *Rome: for this degree is a* « *kinde of tye, or Ligament of* « *both the other.*

2. The Peeres contend with the people [usually] about honours, Offices, Tributes, and Matrymonie, and Lands, and the like: and if the Nobility get the day, the Republique is ruin'd; for it is necessary for them to keep under a jealous and suspicious people, and thence comes their downfall. But if the people gain the day, the matter's worse then before, for either the Nobles are driven into banishment, or else they call in strangers, and so the people become a prey to every crafty Citizen, or forreign potentate, or valiant Commander.

If once the Nobles mix and couple themselves with the

Plebians, to the end they may partake of the government with them; they grow vile and despicable both together, and so the common-wealth falls to ground; as it alwaies happened in the Florentine republique, and divers times in that of *Genoa*.

The remedy is, if the *People* (of a middle Size betwixt the Nobles and the pelting Plebeian) get the upper hand, and share Magistracies and honours now and then, and Lands and Provinces also, By such contentions *Rome* flourished and grew great, and yet granted the honour of Victories, and the credit of them, to the Commons: but *Florence* perished under them.

3. A republique is often destroyed, when Lawes are made to

to the advantage of *great ones*, and preſſure of the people.

4. When the *Powers* in being, *uſurpe Anthority* [over the people] and keep guards for their defence; as the *Decemviri* did at *Rome*, and the *Thirty Tyrants* at *Athens*.

5. The *Luxury* of the *Nobles*, and their neglect of Armes [and Arts] makes them vile and cheap in the peoples eyes; and ſo makes a republique ſink into a baſe *Democracy*.

6. When a *Patrician* grows too rich [and] potent, and Emulations grow rife about priority, then the republique's loſt: So *Sylla* when he had ſubdued *Marius*, and *Ceſar* when *Craſſus* was ſlaine, and *Pompey* conquered (who were then

then Rivalls in the Empire) carried all before them, and were Tyrants at pleasure.

7. Correspondency with some forraign Prince, of any person in power, may ruine a republique.

8. When any fawning Poplicola, in a time of Famin, or other occasion, endeavours to gain the people by opportunity and advantage, and by such arts, gets the power into his own clutches; these must be lookt to, and suppressed, as *Metius* was in *Rome*, &c. and *Manlius* &c. which King *David* neglecting in *Absolom*, run the hazard [of his life and Crown.]

9. A *Republique* falls to ground oft-times, because it wants a *Militia*; when the people & Patritians mutually fear

fear one another, and thereupon call in forraign Commanders, which is uſuall in *Venice*.

Which commanders after ſome ſignal Victory obtained, either themſelves ſeize upon the common wealth (as *Sforza* did at *Millain*, and *Bartholomew Coline* might have done at *Venice*)or elſe they betray it to forraign Princes, as *Malateſta* did *Florence*.

* or Colion.

10. The faction of Citizens, that bear affection to ſome faction of ſtrangers, ruine a republique; ſo all the republiques of *Italy* ſplit themſelves into *Guelfes* and *Gibellins*, or (which was worſt of all) into *Neuters*; whereupon dire and diſmall ſlaughters and times enſued.

A Republique muſt never be

be *Neutrall*, becauſe it muſt neceſſarily be a prey to the Conqueror, not being ſupported either by friends or enemies [*Nec amicis nec inimicis fota. Lat.*]

11. A *Republique* falls, when the *People* confide not in the *Nobility*, nor the *Nobility* in them; and therefore they call in a forraign *Umpire*, that will devour them both: as *Florence* call'd in King *Robert*, &*the Duke of *Athens*.

*or Generall Dux.

The remedy is, to commit the Vmpirage of the quarrell (not to ſtrangers, but) to religious men, Prieſts that are Natives; as *Moiſes* did by Gods command, and as the *Obſervator* well notes, "*The* "*old Gauls did to the Dru-*"*ides, and oft times both they* "*and the Germans, to* [*godly*

"*and*

"*and*] *grave Matrons. But* "*this latter is a crude obſer-* "*vation.*

12. Changes of Republique are innumerable, as their cauſes are. Read the Florentine Hiſtory (for that City ran through all varieties of change) and in oppoſition to that the Roman.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the Fate and change of Popular, or Democratique *ſtates, &c.*

1. A *Democracy*, or *Popular State* aſſuredly goes to wrack, when *Ignorant Plebeians* rule, that canno agree amongſt themſelves, and determine all things by

by chance or affection.

2. Popular elections are ever attended with jarring, and noise of the multitude, and obstreperous rabble.

3. In the Senate or Parliaments of Popular States, he that has the smoothest tongue, is likeliest to cheat the people, and make himselfe be elected, [rules in chief] though he be the veriest *Knave* in the *Pack*.

4. It marres a Popular State, when the poorest of the people endeavour to grow rich by publique Offices, and the wealthier sort grow Tyrannous by their riches.

It is dangerous to call in a stranger to the administration of justice, as the *Florentines* used to do; for this is a symptome of dissention amongst the

the Natives, and oft brings ruine with it, [*yet has it been practiſed elſe-where of late, but with like ſucceſſe.*]

5. *This Paragraph about proviſions and ſupplying the publick neceſſities by Corn, &c. is treated of in the precedent Chapter.*

6. The next Barre of a Democratique State is, the *Generall* that fights their Battails abroad, and returnes home a King as well as a Conqueror; as *Sforza* returned to *Millain*, and *Ceſar* to *Rome*, &c.

Obſerv.

"*The Romans provided excellently againſt this miſchief, they had ever at hand good ſtore of fitt and able men for the conduct of any Warre, and ever and anone chang-*

"*changed their Commanders,*
"*whereby they both secured*
"*their liberty, and by emu-*
"*lation provok'd them to ver-*
"*tue and valour.*

7. An other Engine to batter down Democracy, is a *Publique Benefactor*: that has got Power into his hands: and pretends himself in hazard of his life by Conspirators: and thereupon desires a kind of LifeGuard for the safety of his Person, against his accusers & those he would accuse, and so being thus well provided, hee invades the Throne, (if I may so say) and dubbs himself King; so did *Pisistratus* at *Athens*.

To prevent this: The People must commit themselves, to the care and Providence of wise and religious men: reposing all trust, and confidence in

in them: For by not believing *Solon* the Philosopher, who discover'd to them the design of *Pisistratus*, the Athenians lost their Liberty.

8. A Common wealth may fall, by the approach of sudda'n [and unexpected] dangers: the Common people being dull & heavy, in deliberations. So the Romanes lost *Saguntum* whilst they [slowly] consulted, how to get it: and the Venetians *Cyprus*, whilst they coldly deliberate how to relieve it.

In this case a *Dictator* must must speedily be pitch'd upon: to Rule, and dispatch every thing as himself sees most Expedient, without Counsell or controll of any man. Necessity it self will compell the people to pitch upon none, but the best

best and ableſt man for that ſervice: as the Practice of the Romanes [in that caſe] does witneſſe.

9. A *Popular* State may miſcarry too by ſome wealthy Citizen: who does favour and foſter Poets and Oratours, and Preachers, & Grammarians, and all ſorts of men, that have Eloquence or wit, and by his riches, keeps an *Academy* in his own houſe: of men that can Blazon, & Trumpet forth his praiſes and worth to the People *&c.* Thus became *Coſmo Medices* Duke of *Florence.*

Let no man, that ſets his wits and tongue to ſale, have any part in any Senate or Parliament. *Greece* quite loſt herſelf, by the *Liberty* of *Orations*: ſo did *Germany* and *France* [by ſermons] and the *Switzers*

Switzers too late provided a remedy againſt this diſeaſe.

The Laſt Paragraph concerning the danger of change.

All *Change* (be it never ſo little) of the Antient ſtate of things, in a Commonwealth, or Kingdome is either, a Sign, or Cauſe, or Con-Cauſe, or Preparation, to an Univerſall change of minds : and (by conſequence) of all the Republique, or Princedome revolting from its own Principles. As new meates, and new Exerciſe, beget a new habit of Body. So

Darius by affecting to wear a *Macedonian* ſword, did foretell that his Kingdome ſhould be ruin'd by the armes of *Macedon.* Therefore the change even

even of old Fashions in Apparell, of Banquets and *Marriages*, and of womens behaviour, and of old Discipline, and the Pravity and corruption of youth (as *Censorinus* notes) new *Lawes* and *Tributes* ought ever to be avoided: for they either suddenly, or totally, destroy a Kingdom: Whereupon the *Venetian* will not change so much as his old Originall Garbe in his cloths for (as *Solomon* saies) *Hee that failes in the least things, shall by degrees come to nought.*

The *COROLLARIE*, and Conclusion.

It is Probitie, and Pietie, that preserves a King and People: and not the unlearned Craft, and subtletie of Machiavell:

avell : *For all Vertue, and Power, derives its Originall from Him: who is the Eſſentiall Power, and Wiſdom of his Father that Governs all things. To whom be all Glory.*

FINIS.